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LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
EXPROPRIATION
Melvin G. Dakin*
AUTHORITY TO TAKE-NATURE OF THE INTEREST
In 1978 the Louisiana legislature made a beginning at remedying
the present inequities of appropriation by providing for the payment
of fair market value for such takings, rather than merely assessed
value as in the past. Actual payment under the provisions, however,
has been suspended until an appropriation of funds has been made
by Congress, the state legislature or an appropriate levee board.'
Nonetheless, in Pillow v. Board of Commissioners for the Fifth Loui-
siana Levee District,' the possibility that just compensation might
at least be available prompted the filing of a suit seeking an injunc-
tion against further appropriations. The primary purpose of this
class action in inverse expropriation was to achieve "pending on
July 10, 1978" status for the claims arising from resolutions of ap-
propriation already made or to be made by the levee district in con-
cert with the United States Corps of Engineers. The prayer for in-
junctive and declaratory relief against planned appropriations was
based on the argument that Eldridge v. Trezevant, which upheld a
levee servitude in the public from the time of severance of riparian
lands from the public domain, was wrongly decided under the
United States Constitution. The court rejected the plea for class ac-
tion status, the only issue before it, but allowed the suit to proceed
as an ordinary action in inverse expropriation. The limits of
Eldridge were also tested in Deltic Farm and Timber Co. v. Board
of Commissioners for the Fifth Louisiana Levee District,' in which
the levee district sought to appropriate lands which were not
riparian at the time of severance from the public domain but had
become so due to course changes and erosion by the river. The
owners were adjudged entitled to full compensation under ex-
propriation principles; appropriation of land under Civil Code article
665 was limited to lands riparian at the time of severance from the
public domain since only as to such lands was a levee servitude re-
tained.
*Professor Emeritus of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 38:281B (Supp. 1978). See the Work of the Louisiana Legislature for
the 1978 Regular Session-Expropriation, 39 LA. L. RaV. 205 (1978).
2. 369 So. 2d 1172 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
3. 160 U.S. 452 (1896).
4. 368 So. 2d 1109 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
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In State v. City of New Orleans,' the city unsuccessfully sought
to establish that it had been deprived of private property without
compensation by the incorporation of part of the Basin Canal into
the interstate system. However, the property was deemed never to
have become private property since it was originally public land in
the hands of the state and had been donated to the city specifically
for the purpose of completing the Union Passenger Terminal
facilities by the city. Thus, the property was deemed never to have
left the public domain and conversion to interstate use was a mere
modification in the public use thereof and not an expropriation.
DAMAGES
The First Circuit Court of Appeal in Marathon Pipe Line Co. v.
Pitcher' affirmed an award for the value of a servitude taken and
for severance damages resulting from the presence of a petroleum
pipeline. In lieu of awarding the cost of encasing the pipeline under
a future access road should the tract be developed as a subdivision,
the trial court imposed an obligation, running to the owner and suc-
cessors in title, requiring the expropriator to encase the pipeline
should the street be constructed. This portion of the judgment was
affirmed by the court of appeal. Upon review,' however, the Loui-
siana Supreme Court found that the court-imposed obligation was
not compensation made by "a price in money," as required by Loui-
siana law.8 The court suggested that, even as a setoff against
damage, the arrangement might not be permissible since a 1974 pro-
vision precludes setoff of benefits against the value of property
taken and specifically requires that "the owner shall be compen-
sated to the full extent of his loss."9 Such an interpretation, that
special benefits can no longer be setoff against severance damages,
if applied to takings on behalf of the public, could prove costly in-
deed to the public fisc. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Tate pointed
out that this provision, taken from the 1974 constitution," could
hardly be deemed to require payment "for losses which have not oc-
curred and which may never occur."'" He reasoned that the trial
court's obligation imposed sensible and adequate protection for the
owner in lieu of denying speculative severance damages and was
5. 360 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
6. 361 So. 2d 314 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
7. 368 So. 2d 994 (La. 1979).
8. Id. at 998, citing LA. CONST. of 1921, art. I, § 2; LA. CIV. CODE arts. 497 &
2633-34; Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Lasseigne, 256 La. 919, 240 So. 2d 707 (1970).
9. LA. R.S. 19:9 (1950 & Supp. 1974).
10. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
11. 368 So. 2d at 999 (Tate, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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well within the sound discretion of the trial court; nonetheless, the
supreme court rejected this middle ground and awarded compensa-
tion for what apparently is only potential damage.
State v. Lutcher & Moore Cypress Lumber Co. 2 involved the
taking of swamp land for interstate construction. The trial court
made a sweeping finding that some 23,000 acres had suffered a
dimunition of ten percent in value. The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peal modified this award by giving credence to evidence that ex-
isting access to major portions of the swamp land was left un-
disturbed by the interest taken. A "lump-sum judgment factor,"
without sales data, was deemed to be inadequate supporting
evidence for the massive severance damages awarded by the trial
court.
In another loss-of-access case, Boothe v. Department of Public
Works,' 3 manifest error by a trial court also resulted in excessive
severance damages. The owner argued that the expropriation by the
state prevented access to a "ford," the right to which had been ac-
quired by prescription; the argument, accepted by the trial court,
was overturned on appeal on the basis that such a servitude was
discontinuous in nature" and could be acquired only by title. Fur-
thermore, the "ford" had not become part of a public road since it
had never been maintained or worked by parish authorities."
VALUATION
In State v. McInnis,7 the Third Circuit Court of Appeal allowed
an owner of land appraised as commercial to recover substantially in
excess of salvage value for residential improvements thereon. The
court accomplished this anomalous result by finding that the im-
provements were an enhancement to the value of the property "for
some types of commercial purposes."'8 The court utilized a "formula"
applied in similar circumstances in State v. Goldberg9 to reduce
replacement value of the residence by thirty percent. A less ar-
bitrary procedure might have been to allow enhancement of com-
mercial value to the extent of the capitalized value, at a relatively
high capitalization rate, of the short-term income potential of the im-
12. 364 So. 2d 134 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
13. 370 So. 2d 1282 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
14. LA. CIV. CODE art. 727.
15. LA. CIv. CODE art. 766 (as it appeared prior to 1977 La. Acts, No. 514). (current
version at LA. CIv. CODE art. 739).
16. LA. R.S. 48:491 (1950 & Supp. 1954).
17. 360 So. 2d 887 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
18. Id. at 890.
19. 223 So. 2d 174 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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provement.0 In his dissent, Judge Cutrer could find no contributory
value in the improvements, noting that the fact that the owner
"paid for them and should be reimbursed" was hardly compliance
with the appraisal requirement noted in Goldberg, i.e., "[c]onsidera-
tion of the value of... buildings and improvements is limited to the
extent only that they enhance the value of the land."21
As has been noted, the new constitution significantly expanded
the concept of compensation by adding to the expropriation provi-
sion the requirement that "the owner shall be compensated to the
full extent of his loss ... "22 The Louisiana Supreme Court announced
in State v. Constant2 that, in view of this addition, "it is not con-
stitutionally significant that the award . . . will exceed the market
value of the property used in . . . business operations."2'
PROCEDURE
In Hodges v. LaSalle Parish Police Jury,2" a tenant seeking
damages for expropriation of leased property was deemed not to
have alleged a "compensable legal status running with the land"" in
pleading that he had the "use" and "possession" of property.
However, the trial court committed error in not affording the tenant
an opportunity to amend his pleadings so as to state a cause of ac-
tion as tenant. 27 A trial court also committed error in Wright v.
State2 ' by awarding damages for contempt of a court injunction in
which, before the injunction against appropriation of air space could
become executory, the state amended its petition to expropriate the
air space for a bridge over a previously dedicated street, thus cur-
ing the contempt.
Compensation was denied in Brooks v. New Orleans Public Ser-
20. See M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA 236 (1970) & 87
(Supp. 1978).
21. 223 So. 2d at 177, quoting 4 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.11
(3d ed. 1950).
22. LA. CONST. art. I § 4.
23. 369 So. 2d 699 (La. 1979).
24. Id. at 702. A student note appearing in this issue of the Review examines in
detail the reasoning and holding in the case and concludes that the court has not here
made an award of compensation which could not have been justified under the
jurisprudence prior to the adoption of the language of the new constitution. See Note,
Expropriation. Compensating the Landowner to the Full Extent of His Loss, 40 LA. L.
REV. 817 (1980).
25. 368 So. 2d 1117 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
26. Id. at 1118.
27. See LA. CODE Crv. P. art. 934.
28. 359 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
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vice' for an unauthorized taking under the St. Julien doctrine." The
property, over which an unauthorized servitude was alleged, had
been acquired by the present owner subject to the servitude and
with no express assignment of any right to compensation. The right
in such circumstances has been held to be personal to the owner at
the time of the taking and hence actionable by a later owner only if
expressly transferred to him. 1
In State v. Bougere,2 a court of appeal took occasion to note
again that while determination of expert fees is generally within the
discretion of the trial court, the denial of fees for preparatory work
was arbitrary where the results of such work were evident in the
record. The court also found no justification for denial of a fee to an
expert for services rendered on a report which was the basis for a
stipulation used at the trial and therefore useful to the court. In
1974 the state legislature provided discretionary authority to the
courts for award of an attorney's fee not in excess of twenty-five
percent of the difference between the award and the amount
deposited by the state in the registry of the court.3 In State v.
Frabbiele,34 the court had occasion to note that the statute provides
for an award and sets a limit thereon; it does not, however,
eliminate the need for adducing evidence as to the reasonableness of
a fee award. A judgment allowing a full twenty-five percent, despite
the absence of any testimony of effort expended or time involved,
was therefore remanded to the trial court for the purpose of taking
such testimony and assessing a fee based thereon.
BURDEN OF PROOF-EVIDENCE
While damages resulting from inconvenience or discomfort are
normally not compensable, recovery has been allowed to the extent
such damages decrease the market value of the owner's remaining
property. However, as with severance damages generally, if the ex-
propriator contends there has been no effect on market value, the
owner has the burden of proof to establish such damage by
29. 370 So. 2d 686 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
30. St. Julien v. Morgan La. & Tex. R.R., 35 La. Ann. 924 (1883).
31. Gumbel v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 197 La. 439, 1 So. 2d 686 (1941). Lake,
Inc. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 330 So. 2d 914 (La. 1976), holding a transmission
line to be a discontinuous servitude not within the St. Julien doctrine, and the subse-
quent legislative partial overruling of the Lake case, see LA. R.S. 19:14 (Supp. 1976),
had no effect since the instant servitude was taken prior to such judicial and
legislative action. 370 So. 2d at 688-89.
32. 363 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
33. LA. R.S. 48:453 (Supp. 1954 & 1974).
34. 372 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
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evidence. In State v. Johnson,5 the third circuit based its award for
inconvenience on the subjective opinion of the owner that he had
suffered an aesthetic and convenience loss in addition to the
severance damages awarded for a decrease in value of the premises
after the taking. Citing State v. Champagne,"' the court held that,
even within the broadened language of the 1974 constitution, an
owner is not entitled to recover for what "he subjectively believes
to be his loss.
317
Traditionally, the trial court is vested with great discretion in
setting an award within the limits of the evidence adduced for the
record. It is not generally bound by the testimony of the experts ex-
cept that such testimony will set the upper and lower limits of an
award.3 8 Thus, in Louisiana Gas Purchasing Corp. v. Sincox,3' the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeal found no error on the part of the trial
court in making an award which was not in "the exact amount
established by the testimony of the experts."4 The same court seem-
ingly contradicted the foregoing by announcing in State v. Dance'1
that "[a] trial court may not substitute its opinion for that of the ex-
perts who testified at the trial." 2 However, the court's holding goes
no further than to correct the trial court in exceeding the limits of
severance damage testified to by any expert. Similarly, in State v.
Eubanks,'" upon which the second circuit relied in making its an-
nouncement, the third circuit corrected a trial court in awarding
severance damages in excess of the highest amount "[aiccording to
the testimony of the experts."" Perhaps a more precise statement
would be that "a trial court may not substitute its opinion for that
of the experts who testified at the trial as to the upper and lower
limits of an award."
35. 369 So. 2d 191 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979). See also State v. Olivier, 365 So. 2d
1164 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
36. 356 So. 2d 1136 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
37. 369 So. 2d at 194, quoting State v. Champagne, 356 So. 2d at 1140.
38. See M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 20, at 398-99 (1970) & 128-29 (Supp.
1978).
39. 368 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
40. Id. at 817.
41. 367 So. 2d 155 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
42. Id. at 157.
43. 345 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
44. Id. at 537.
